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Covid-19 is a threat, but it also creates opportunities for serious thought about the future. Given 
deep structural problems which have enabled populism to become embedded in England, there is a need 
to think of a longer-term transformation: not whether but how and where the state comes back in, 
and how relations between state, markets and planning, city-regions, innovation and universities are 
reconfigured.
Historically, the two major populist movements in the advanced world (American in the late C19th and 
Germany et al in the 1930s) occurred as a consequence of massive technological changes; the movements 
were not primarily located in the big cities, and they involved those in previously established but now 
declining occupations. Populism only disappeared as those populations reduced in size and as those areas 
changed function or declined much further.
Responding to the ICT revolution, populism in England (the subject of this paper) locates today in 
Rodriguez-Pose’s ‘places that don’t matter’ (PDMs), and is reinforced by the deep educational/residential 
segregation of contemporary society with 50% higher education participation and graduate-intensive 
big cities. But England seems stuck here and major ‘pathologies’ in the neo-liberal framework are 
responsible. These include higher education as a competitive market, the separation of cycles and growth 
in macroeconomic policy, and the reliance on markets with arms-length regulation and de facto absence 
of government from a shareholder-value maximising private sector. Policy is still short-term and largely 
made in Westminster despite city-regions. A long-term policy transformation is necessary to restart 
the ‘transmission belt’ of the ICT revolution. We need developing long-term plans based on city-regional 
agglomerations, into which core city networks linking knowledge-based companies, research universities 
and city-regional administrations are integrated; with expanding travel-to-work areas incorporating the 
‘places that don’t matter’; and supported by a research-oriented economic policy.
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1. Introduction
1.1. How policy making needs to change to undermine populism
How we should remould policy making to undermine populism? Attacking the roots of populism will require major 
– indeed transformational – changes of strategy. This is possibly the case for any country facing a populist threat, but 
is certainly the case for England, the focus here. In particular, this paper raises questions about the unqualified way in 
which the neo-liberal framework shaped UK policy making in recent decades and fed these populist urges.
The COVID-19 pandemic means we are faced with the possibility of a prolonged and perhaps deep recession. It is a 
critical opportunity to rethink a number of basic aspects of policy making in the UK. As the Financial Times wrote on 
the consequences of the pandemic:
Radical reforms – reversing the prevailing policy direction of the last four decades – will need to be put on 
the table. Governments will have to accept a more active role in the economy. They must see public services as 
investments rather than liabilities, and look for ways to make labour markets less insecure. Redistribution will 
again be on the agenda; the privileges of the elderly and wealthy in question…As western leaders learnt in the 
Great Depression, and after the second world war, to demand collective sacrifice you must offer a social contract 
that benefits everyone. (Financial Times, The Editorial Board, 2020 April 4)
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This paper is designed to generate a debate about the need for a more radical long-term plan covering core inter-related 
areas of the economy, going beyond reliance on markets and centralised policy, made at arm’s length from industry. To 
be clear, effective competition is critical for innovation. But so too is an activist government, especially at and across 
city-regional levels, networking with advanced companies and with integrated public services. Change will not be short-
term. Any debate about a nation’s underlying policy framework and the need for deep structural changes is most fruit-
ful if it takes place with a view to the medium- or long-term. The real question is whether such a debate is feasible in 
the chaotic political world we currently live in.
A significant challenge for those seeking to implement such change in England will be to counter the dominant 
populist narrative, still driven by Brexit. There is much uncertainty as to the cause of this populist tendency, but we fol-
low Rodriguez-Pose view that regional inequality is a central cause. Our working hypothesis is that the explanation lies 
in the extraordinary contrast between successful graduate-intensive urban agglomerations and the ‘places that don’t 
matter’ (PDMs) – those places segregated residentially, educationally, occupationally, culturally, and by age. One striking 
measure of the segregation is that 50% of young people go through tertiary education in England (certainly amazing 
by historic standards), but 50% still do not, and it is in this latter group that populism continues to have great appeal. 
Two decades ago this segregation seemed to be diminishing, most importantly through this steady rise in participa-
tion in tertiary education. However, England’s progress in reducing such inequalities has stagnated, a reversal that is 
exemplified most clearly by the now only slight upward trend in higher education participation, as seen in Figure 1. In 
countering the appeal of populism, the question is whether, and how, this stagnation can be reversed. 
1.2. Why has the stasis occurred and what are possible exit strategies? 
The major populist movements in the advanced world over the last century and a half (in the late 19th century, the 
1930s, and contemporaneously) have arisen at times of major technological regime change, which in turn have caused 
economic and social disruption. In each case, large, previously established occupational groups were pushed into 
decline, which also helped to segregate particular regions or territories.
It has been in these areas of decline where populist movements have developed, most often involving those who 
were in established occupations subject to the prolonged process of decline. The most notable instances have been the 
US in the late 19th century (the second Industrial Revolution), focused on the small farms and farming communities; 
Germany in the 1930s (the Fordist Revolution), once more centred on farmers, but also small town petty bourgeois, 
artisans, and clerical life; and finally the more widespread ICT revolution of the 2010s, centred on industry and clerical 
occupations, and encompassing smaller urban and rural areas, and now declining ex-industrial cities.
Figure 1: Higher Education Student Numbers, UK 1994–2019.
This is taken from Higher Education Student Numbers House of Commons Library Briefing Papers No. 7857, 13th March 
2020, Paul Bolton.
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Historically, such populist pressures only ended through major occupational and geographic change, particularly 
when there was a sufficiently large move out of the declining occupations. This was most often achieved through the 
old populations dying and the young moving elsewhere, often into newly emergent jobs and industries. For instance, in 
late-19th-century America it was the industrial boom in growing cities and WWI that provided the solution. So did the 
Fordist boom in the post-WWII decades for continental Europe.
The contemporary world is stuck in the implementation of this change. Working by historical analogy, the ICT revo-
lution could hope to resolve the threat of populism through a move away from assembly-line manufacturing jobs 
and, by increasing tertiary education, into ‘graduate jobs’, using these jobs to transform cities. However, in England 
much of this change has already taken place, with the tertiary participation now stagnant. Thus, the country is in 
stasis. 
2. The English Knowledge-Based Neo-Liberal Framework and Its Six Pathologies
For the ICT revolution to flourish, a neo-liberal framework1 was initially necessary. It allowed a partial dismantling of 
the unionised, Fordist-Chandlerian economy, which had involved nationalised industries, capital controls, protected 
financial systems, and state intervention. However, while it may have been initially necessary, the major pathologies 
within the neo-liberal framework have taken effect over the last three decades, particularly as a result of the dominant 
position it took in policy making in England.2 Some of the framework’s elements are valid: it is clear that knowledge 
economies flourish with competitive markets in innovative technologies and high value-added industries, especially 
when provided with access to high-risk finance and reservoirs of highly-educated workers. However, this has created 
the illusion that there always efficient market solutions to problems, with the consequence of down-playing the role of 
government. For meaningful change to continue, we need to recognise the role of government, echoing the broad type 
of approach Polanyi brilliantly used in the The Great Transformation [1].
2.1. Higher education as a competitive market
The first pathology in the UK is that higher education developed into a competitive market, as Camilla Cavendish has 
forcefully noted [2]. Higher education could have developed in the same way as schools, which certainly compete, but 
within a highly constrained ‘state’ system: For example, if the school leaving age is raised, young people are required to 
stay an additional year in school. Similarly, the examination system is centrally controlled and administered, as are resi-
dential rules for admission. Instead, despite having government-set participation targets, higher education has become 
a competitive market, free from significant government oversight. 
Or, rather, it has become two markets. One is for investment goods – the collection of skills, personal networks and 
certifications that make up a university education. Here, supply is provided, marketed, and sold by universities, with the 
demand side fulfilled by student participants, who choose to invest in a sunk-cost, long-term asset with an unknown 
rate of return. 
The second market is for the services provided by these student participants after graduation, with demand being 
met by graduate jobs. Apart from the auditing of teaching and research, assessing student satisfaction, and validating 
degrees, the state plays a limited role. 
So participation in the higher education sector has become a market choice. Over the medium-term, the sector 
depends on the direct demand for graduates in the job market, and indirectly depends on the graduate premium for 
both the graduates and the employers, as the Goldin-Katz model shows [3]. This means that stagnation may plausibly 
follow as a result of the following trends:
•	 a decline in new graduate jobs as a result of the slowdown of innovation and productivity growth (see below); and 
•	 the austerity-induced freeze in health and education spending on training new doctors and nurses, and the 
continuing low status and reward structure of teacher careers (see below). 
2.2. Macroeconomic policy with private consumption as macroeconomic driver
When the neo-liberal framework was applied to macroeconomic policy, it was dominated by inflation targeting. Inde-
pendent central banks used short-term interest rates as an instrument, while capital mobility has meant that the long-
term real interest rate has been pinned by the world rate. In recent years (since the financial crisis) the zero lower bound 
on the nominal interest rate has resulted in a reliance on fiscal policy.
 1 Neo-liberal framework’ has become a shorthand in the political economy literature for the major shift away in policy development from the key 
role of the state to a greater reliance on markets. In the UK this gathered speed during the 1980s in the Thatcher administrations. It refers very 
loosely (as an idealised picture of the justification of policy making by governments internally and in self-presentation to the wider electorate) to: 
greater use of markets in a range of areas such as housing and transport; an emphasis on denationalisation and increased market competition, 
domestically and in Europe; treating universities as a competitive market; capital mobility and widespread liberalisation of controls in finance, 
permitting greater risk-taking; a well-developed shareholder-oriented market in corporate control; central bank autonomy and responsibility for 
an inflation target via interest-rate setting, international capital mobility and the elimination of exchange controls; and fiscal policy focussed on 
low taxes and playing a minimal role in discretionary macroeconomic management.
 2 See Schmidt and Thatcher for a sophisticated comparative discussion, explaining why the UK form of liberalism was ‘purer’ than elsewhere, 
Schmidt, V. and M. Thatcher, Eds. (2013). Resilient Liberalism in Europe’s Political Economy, Cambridge University Press.
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In turn, fiscal policy has operated with fiscal rules consistent with a target for the public-debt-to-GDP ratio. Since a 
rise in public investment results in an increase in public debt – with any increase in public sector (or national) wealth 
disregarded – borrowing has been restricted. This has played a leading part in the public sector austerity of recent years, 
very much including the sharp slowdown in discretionary spending (including investment) in health and education.
And while governments have been keen to encourage private sector borrowing, the secular slowdown in expected and 
actual GDP growth has substantially dampened private sector investment (despite profitability) including in research 
and development (R&D) and productivity enhancements. In contrast, household borrowing to finance private con-
sumption expenditure has not been constrained, with mortgage collateral provided by rising house prices. 
Most worrying is that the core distinction in macroeconomics between growth and cycle may have broken down, as 
Cerra et al. suggest [4]. If both public and private investment are declining as the direct and indirect result of public 
debt ratio targeting, then innovation and productivity growth is likely to decline; because that reduces GDP growth, 
austerity policies have to deepen in order to meet the debt ratio targets, further dampening investment, innovation, 
and productivity growth. This Kaldorian vicious circle is reinforced by hysteresis effects on human capital.
2.3. Low tax rates on higher incomes
There is one further element of fiscal policy, emphasised in the neo-liberal framework, that has played a long-term 
role in the stagnation. This is that income tax rates should be lowered on higher incomes to encourage risk-taking. 
This reflected the perception that financial risks were higher as a result of the ICT revolution (and the uncertainties as 
to what directions innovation would come from), and that increased human capital had potentially very high returns. 
It is doubtful that the increase in post-tax inequality and the high post-tax rewards for those working in high value-
added private service sectors have played a major part in promoting innovation [5]. The costs of lower taxes, especially 
when imposed at times of relatively low growth (most notably during the austerity period after the financial crash), have 
been mostly borne by public services.
This has meant that many public sector jobs are confined to low levels of pay. While these jobs are often viewed as 
graduate-level, they tend to come with a low career premium, and so fail to stimulate higher education participation. 
For instance, for public sector teachers there has been some increase in pay (particularly in starting salaries), but any 
meaningful increases have been constrained by low tax rates elsewhere. This correlates with research of Goldin and 
Katz, who argue that the slowdown in the supply of new graduates between 2000 and 2017 is due to the fact that the 
graduate premium is confined to the top half of graduates [3].
As a consequence, public school teaching remains a low-paid and low-status career – especially in relation to higher-
level private sector services. And new teachers frequently spend only a few years teaching before moving elsewhere. 
Thus, even the provision of new graduate teaching jobs may be unattractive for raising higher education participation, 
if linked with a low career premium. 
In summary: the rise in post-tax earnings for high earners is linked to the failure of higher education to continue past 
rates of growth, while also holding back increases, for instance, in the numbers of doctors and teachers.
2.4. Governmental withdrawal from R&D
In addition to the economic pressures, neo-liberal thinking has tended to oppose government intervention in research 
and development. Bloom et al. have argued, albeit in the context of the US, that the policies that enhance innovation 
are: high-skilled immigration, open and competitive trade, and state subsidies on private R&D spending. Direct inter-
vention, such as DARPA assisting in the development of the internet, seems to have been less helpful. 
2.5. Economic geography, tipping points, and the limits to markets – Networked agglomerated cities and 
‘places that don’t matter’
The main growth drivers of neo-liberal economies (according to the research of Katz and Brookings in the US) are 
successful cities. In America, such cities tend to be those that have strong research universities, prominent new tech-
nology sectors, and high value-added private sector services such as law, finance, and consultancy. Closely attached 
are secondary economy industries, including government, media, and culture. These cities are surrounded by well-
connected travel-to-work areas, with abundant housing. In America, there is a major focus on building and maintaining 
strong networks among these sectors, particularly between the university and innovation sectors and government and 
knowledge-based business. 
This model is not followed in England. Research universities are seldom core actors in the economy and the networks 
between sectors hardly exist. The model implies social externalities (to the cities they are in) from investment in expan-
sion of research universities. In principle, research universities should enjoy strategic complementarities with city-
regional government and major knowledge-based companies, with all the players committing to long-run investments 
in order to profit from ‘knowledge’ agglomeration. But credible commitments are difficult to make. In effect then, 
major northern cities in England may suffer from ‘under agglomeration’, as Overman has underlined [6].
Much as the English state has relied on markets to establish links among universities, it has also relied on them 
to resuscitate the ‘places that don’t matter’. This reliance worsens the PDM problem. Many could be potential com-
muter towns or cities, functioning as travel-to-work areas. However, due to the underinvestment in these areas, with 
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governments not refurbishing transport systems that were set up for an industrial era or renewing the housing stock, 
they remain unattractive. There is no market solution here, as the younger people and potential commuters have 
either moved away from or refuse to move to PDMs, and so private transport companies have limited reason to invest 
in transport infrastructure. This, in turn, means that private housing developers have no incentive to build. Thus, PDMs 
remain PDMs. 
2.6. Shareholder-value maximisation
Shareholder-value maximisation has become (and more or less remained) the dominant focus among publicly quoted 
companies. This has been particularly apparent in the UK, due to its especially shareholder-friendly takeover rules. The 
focus on shareholders receiving a rapid return on their investment has led to short-term profit maximisation at the 
expense of employee skills, R&D spending, and sustainability. In turn, this has made longer-term cooperation and com-
mitment between the public and private sectors harder. 
Very large asset management institutions, especially those with ‘passive’ management strategies, such as Blackrock, 
Vanguard, and Fidelity, are also aware that long-term decision making leads to higher shareholder value. Larry Fink, 
the CEO of Blackrock has ‘explained’ this in his 2018 and 2019 letters to the CEOs of companies in which Blackrock has 
shareholdings. Likewise, an important book by Colin Mayer shows inter alia how companies can work effectively with 
government, especially at the city-regional level, by redefining their legal purpose [7].
3. Transformative Strategies? Blue Skies Thinking
We argued above that some governments have over-relied on markets and that this has led to the decline of certain 
regions, which have become vulnerable to populism. Rather than leaving the key choices to markets, the state needs to 
think in terms of long-term interrelated plans, with markets operating on a secondary level. In taking this approach, a 
long-term perspective is fundamental, given the nature of the problems we are trying to solve. 
These plans need to be first constructed at city-regional level, with these city-regions then linked. For instance, here 
we focus on Manchester and its surrounding area, but this would ideally form part of a cross-Pennine link, encompass-
ing Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield. Following McCann, a model for these cities to follow would be London 
and the South-East, where the economic growth of the cities is seen as benefiting other regions rather than draining 
their resources. Alongside this, the political infrastructure of these regions would develop, with local governments in 
place in each city-region.
Next we model what policy would have to look like for the following (or similar) to be achieved:
1. Raising the higher education participation rate to 80% by 2030. This would be achieved by restructuring and 
differentiating tertiary education while simultaneously regenerating growth of graduate careers in the private 
and public sectors. 
2. Integrating PDMs into the Manchester travel-to-work area, while constructing networks between research 
universities, city-regional government, and knowledge-based companies. 
3. Restarting productivity growth based on these networks, alongside a new macroeconomic policy that integrates 
counter-cyclical and pro-growth policies.
All these three questions need to be seen in the context of AI and the associated technologies. The term ‘AI’ will be used 
to refer to this huge change which will dominate the next decade – and far beyond. AI will lead to re- and upskilling, 
to job changes within and between companies, as well as career switches; the evidence increasingly suggests this will 
greatly favour graduates and disadvantage those without tertiary education. This will dominate all levels of tertiary 
education. ‘More generally, as Angus Deaton has said: “This BA/non-BA divide just comes up again and again”’ [8].
3.1. Major increase in higher education participation: Two levels of tertiary education 
Higher education participation needs to increase in the long-term, and with this growth of graduates we need a cor-
responding growth of graduate jobs. Our research university system is surpassed only by that in the US, but both the 
form and the content of higher education needs to change in major ways.
(1) Every comparable advanced country other than the UK has a two-part tertiary system. The main degree route 
is offered alongside a lower-level vocational education, usually a two-year college system. A community 
college system on American lines can act as a connective between PDMs and Manchester. Given the defined 
economic needs of the region, responsibility for the syllabi and qualifications must lie with the city-regional 
government. 
(2) Teaching should become a high-status career, attracting some of the ablest students. Currently, teaching 
conditions and pay mean that many leave after only a few years in the profession. There is a major case for 
raising national income tax in order to increase all teacher salaries, not just at entry level. The argument that 
low taxes on high incomes incentivises workers is not strong enough [5] to displace the advantages of better 
teacher pay. 
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(3) Moreover, there is a need to improve the level of primary and secondary education in PDMs, providing children 
with the skillset needed to enter university. While hiring more able teachers and introducing community college 
is an important part of this, given the fundamental learning difficulties that stem from disadvantage – particu-
larly for boys, as Chetty has shown [9] – ultimately it is the integration of these PDMs in the Manchester TTWA 
that is critical. 
(4) Financing wider higher education participation. This should be considered in the same way as raising the school 
leaving age. Much as the advantages offered by leaving at 18 warrant sixth form being free at point of use, the 
same applies to universities. Therefore, if necessary, paying for a high level of university participation should be 
done through higher tax rates. 
(5) In pushing for more vocational components to form a part of tertiary education at community colleges, there 
needs to be a greater consideration of the need for professional schools. 
(6) Expanding higher education participation requires a corresponding expansion of graduate jobs; here a contin-
gent strategy is needed. Here again city-regional government needs to be involved: There is a huge shortage of 
UK-trained doctors and nurses, partly as a result of austerity. And place-based job creation needs to be planned 
out with the NHS.
3.2. Integrating PDMs into the TTW of the city-region and building it up further as a successful agglomeration. 
In elevating Manchester, the focus should ultimately be on developing the whole Northern city-belt into a ‘northern 
polygon’, orientated around Manchester, a counterpart to the ‘southern polygon’ orientated around London. Using 
the development of American cities as an example [10], city-regional mayors need to devote resources to building up 
inner-city networks, connecting leaders across the major sectors. Developing these sectors and networks will require 
significant investment, financed most likely by borrowing. Much of this spending should be focused on research and 
development, and other research has suggested that there is a strong basis for innovation districts to be established. 
Funding could also be awarded on a competitive basis, such as Mayor Bloomberg’s New York competition, which invited 
external universities to bid for a major new campus. This is similar to the system of Germany’s federal government, 
which awards cities major funding that links together the universities, major companies, select smaller companies, and 
external research systems. This forces different bodies from within the same city-region to cooperate. 
Simultaneously with the development of fast transport systems and the refurbishment of housing stock (see below), 
these should work to bring in knowledge-based multinational corporations and their subsidiary networks. It should 
also bring in students, young professionals, and tourists. If established correctly, this system should result in a positive 
multiplier effect, leading to a rise in house prices in Manchester’s and other integrated cities’ CBDs. In turn, this should 
invite the integration of other peripheral cities, such as Bolton, Bury, and Wigan into the greater metropolitan area.
For the development of these fast transport linkages and the refurbishment of housing stock, the relationship 
between city-regional government and private companies needs to be redefined, shifting the focus away from immedi-
ate shareholder maximisation. This means that franchising is not an effective way forward, as it creates too strong a 
temptation to game the system. Instead, there needs to be an alignment between the interests of high-level manage-
ment in industry and the city-regional government. This alignment would point towards a ‘social purpose’ company, 
or a new model of high-level municipalisation. Such a purpose could incorporate some elements of experimentation, 
with the city-region functioning as a laboratory for technological advancements, such as through the construction of 
rapid transport systems instead of solely rail links. This would serve as a further enticement for large high-technology 
companies, continuing the positive multiplier effect. 
3.3. Macroeconomic policy, research, productivity growth
Finally, we turn to macroeconomic policy, a key element of the neo-liberal framework. The key of the separation of 
growth and cycles is admirably summarised in Cerra et al. [4]; see also Benigno and Fornaro [11] and Carlin and Soskice 
[12].
There is a danger implicit in standard inflation-targeting monetary policy, as well as public sector debt-ratio targeted 
fiscal policy, given that productivity growth may depend on expected GDP. Should there be a downturn in growth 
expectations, this assumption would lead to a reduction in productivity growth, which would in turn tighten fiscal and 
monetary policy. Thus, the contraction would be self-fulfilling. 
Below we provide a simple account of how these multiple equilibria can happen. If growth expectations are low, say 
below g*E in Figure 2, then productivity growth (and GDP growth) gets pushed to the low equilibrium [12]. If expecta-
tions are above g*E, then productivity and GDP growth will rise to a higher level. This is a coordination game in pure 
strategies, where there are pessimistic and optimistic equilibria. 
Something like this seems to be at the core of what has happened to productivity growth, perhaps through the 2000s 
as well as since the financial crisis. This is not an aggregate demand problem in the ordinary sense, but it suggests an 
active promotion of demand, so growth expectations do not collapse. Arguably the solution involves putting more 
resources into research in both public and private sectors. Tobin referred to this as ‘high-pressure demand policy’. 
Productivity growth, in a skills-biased technical change world then implies the demand for new graduate jobs increases, 
and real earnings increase as well.
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4. Conclusion
To uproot the populist ideology from English soil will take nothing less than another Polanyi-style great transformation. 
This paper sets out a broad long-term strategy that aims to reduce the allure of populism, focusing on three related 
ideas: first, the need to create inclusive growth; second, to promote social mobility out of segregated pockets of society, 
especially PDMs; and third, to recreate the social contract on a regional, national, and cosmopolitan level. This is in 
some ways the most important, and can be achieved through an increase in higher education participation rate and 
the construction of a wide ‘graduate job’ economy. Key to doing this is to develop a long-term strategy for creating cor-
responding growth in regionally-focussed graduate jobs. A major element in doing this will come through the health 
sector, and creating graduate level jobs in the care sector. And a second long-term element from raising productivity 
growth, associated with AI.
We have not discussed the reorganisation of democracy. We are a society without an explicitly populist party, but 
we have a highly populist electorate and a sharply divided political system. It is often suggested that a major reason 
for that is that we are majoritarian system rather than PR. But the sharp divisions and frequent sense of chaos at 
Westminster reflects the absence of a median voter in the national electorate. So the real focus should be on whether 
it is possible, at the city-regional level, to reconstruct this median voter. That is another task that seems necessary to 
uproot populism.
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